Job Market Paper:
"Where Ideology Matters: Evidence from a Global Analysis of Market Intervention"
Abstract: Whether leaders and parties that govern make a difference is of fundamental importance to politics. A vast social-science literature argues that the ideological orientation of governments matters for policymaking, but this research has focused on OECD countries. This narrow focus reflects a lack of data as well as common assumptions that political institutions in non-OECD countries extinguish any effect of government ideology. This paper revisits existing assumptions about the importance of ideology using an original ideology dataset of 178 countries since 1945. Looking at market intervention policies, difference-in-differences estimates provide robust evidence that government ideology matters for some tools of market intervention globally, that it matters more for non-OECD countries, and that political institutions do not condition its effects as presumed. These findings have implications for the studies of partisan politics, political institutions, and the politics in young democracies and non-democracies. (under review)
“Ideologues and Redistribution: Social Service Provision in Democracies and Dictatorships”
Description: This paper revisits the literature on redistribution which has recently explained worldwide differences with varying political institutions, especially the regime type, but has struggled to explain the large variation within democracies and dictatorships. I argue that focusing on the actors and their ideologies within regimes partially explains these differences in redistribution. Combining original ideology data with novel information on social service provision, difference-in-differences estimates demonstrate that leftist governments provide more equal access to education and the welfare state than rightist governments across and within political regimes. Thus, the paper offers a new explanation of worldwide differences in redistribution.
“Coups and their Leaders: A New Comprehensive Dataset, 1950-2020”
(with Tanja Eschenauer-Engler)
Description: This paper present a novel dataset on the identity and military rank of the leaders of all 474 failed and successful coups from 1950 to 2020. The paper discusses how the dataset improves on previous data collection efforts and illustrates the dataset’s uses by showing that contrary to common assumptions in the research on coups, only a majority of coup attempts is led by senior officers, and a large share is instead led by mid-ranking or junior officers and rarely civilians. We further show that that while protests spark coups by senior and more junior officers alike, coups led by senior officers have temporary negative effects for democracy, while the effects of coups led by more junior officers are long-lasting. The article thus underlines the importance for refined empirical measures and theoretical arguments in the study of coups.
Works in progress:
“Identifying Ideologues: A Global Dataset on Chief Executives, 1945-2019”
Description: This paper presents a new dataset on the economic ideologies and political parties of heads of government in 178 countries from 1945 or independence to 2019, and of political leaders in 182 countries from 1945 or independence to 2015. The dataset distinguishes between chief executives with leftist, centrist, rightist, and no discernible economic ideology, and vastly expands the scope and refines the measurement of existing datasets. In addition to describing the dataset’s contents and coding procedures, the paper demonstrates that researchers’ common assumptions of young and non-democracies as non-ideological or exclusively rightist are incorrect and that most of their governments have an identifiable and often leftist ideology. The paper thereby outlines a research agenda to study the global effects of governments’ ideologies on policymaking and socioeconomic outcomes.
“Ideologues and Redistributive Conflict: Leftist and Rightist Social Unrest across Regimes”
Description: This paper investigates whether the ideological orientation of a government sparks social unrest. Specifically, I argue that though having a rightist government in office increases the likelihood of strikes, protests, and the formation of leftist rebel groups, leftist governments make coups and the creation of rightist militias more probable. The reason is that workers and economic elites alike mobilize against implemented or feared disadvantageous policies. I further probe whether leaders’ ideology matters more for social unrest in dictatorships. This would be the case if political institutions constrain dictators less and provide fewer avenues for peaceful conflict resolution than democracies. Using original leader ideology data and recent data on social unrest, the paper provides the first global test of long-standing arguments of the literatures on redistribution and conflict.
Deuter, Jan, Peter Hachemer, Bastian Herre, Natalie Hoffmann, Laura Schelenz, Christoph Trinn, Thomas Wencker (eds.). 2012. Conflict Barometer 2011. Heidelberg.